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Early Years: Up to 1922
Fisher held two chairs in genetics, at
University College in London and then at
Cambridge but, surprisingly, was never a
professor of statistics. Regarding Fisher’s
accomplishments in statistics, Savage (1976)
commented that it would be easier to list the few
topics in which he was not interested. “In the art
of calculating explicit sampling distributions,
Fisher led statistics out of its infancy, and he
may never have been excelled in this skill” (p.
449).
There is much, of course, about which
Fisher was right. Despite his shunning the
concept of Type II errors, Fisher (1928) was the
first to provide formulas for the noncentral Chisquare, t, and F distributions. (The symbol F was
introduced by Snedecor in honor of Fisher, “for
which officiousness,” according to Savage,
“Fisher seems never to have forgiven him” (p.
449)). There once existed a fair amount of
disagreement regarding how to count degrees of
freedom in a contingency table, with Karl

Introduction
I would like once again to thank you for
awarding me this honor last year. Given the
scholars between whom I am sandwiched, the
first honoree, Ingram Olkin, and next year’s,
Joel Levin, I must try very hard to act as though
the committee did not make a serious mistake
with my nomination. Tonight, I’d like to focus
on some of the work of R. A. Fisher, who would
have been 120 years old now, to make a couple
of points of my own. I hope that some of what I
say will give you the same feeling of fun in the
discovery of something neat and surprising as I
experienced.
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series of examples. She stated that compared to
the use of the minimum Chi-square method of
fit, other approaches were arbitrary, including
what she termed “the Gaussian ‘best’ value,” (p.
262) the maximum likelihood approach from
error theory that Fisher had supported in a paper
he wrote as an undergraduate student in 1912.
According to Stigler (2005), in response to a
letter and manuscript that Fisher submitted to
Biometrika, Karl Pearson as editor told Fisher
that he had to demonstrate the logic of
maximum likelihood, to justify it being better
than Smith’s approach. For a while Fisher could
not respond.
The basis for Fisher’s reply came,
possibly by accident (Stigler, 2005), in the late
spring of 1919. Fisher was considering the
relative merits of two alternative estimates of the
standard deviation of a normal distribution: one
was based on the mean absolute deviation, the
other the maximum likelihood solution. He had
considered combining the two estimates in some
way but instead discovered that the whole of the
information regarding σ, which a sample
provides, is summed up in the value of the
maximum likelihood estimator. Not only did it
have a smaller standard deviation, it was, in a
word, sufficient.
On November 17, 1921, Fisher read a
paper to the Royal Society of London entitled
On the Mathematical Foundations of
Theoretical Statistics. The paper opened with a
set of definitions that were, in 1921, entirely
new to statistical theory, but which are now
familiar; they include consistency, efficiency,
estimation,
likelihood,
optimum,
and
sufficiency. Stigler (2005) pointed out that not in
the list is “…another, even more basic statistical
concept: It is in this paper of Fisher’s that the
word ‘parameter’ is first used in the modern
statistical sense” (p. 32). Stigler notes that the
word parameter appears 57 times.
According to Fisher, a consistent
estimate is called efficient if it is asymptotically
normal and if it has the minimum asymptotic
variance (Neyman, 1951). In his 1908 paper,
however, Edgeworth expressed the idea that
maximum likelihood estimates are always
efficient and made several attempts to prove his
conjecture. The proofs, however, “…of the
efficiency of maximum likelihood estimates

Pearson (among others) claiming rc − 1 and
Fisher (1922) correcting to (r − 1)(c − 1). Fisher,
of course, was right here. Fisher was a pioneer in
nonparametric statistics, having suggested the
use of the sign test in place of the t-test in certain
designs, and having introduced what he called
exact tests to avoid the assumption of normality
in many circumstances.
According to Stigler (2005, p. 33), of
Fisher’s 97 publications from 1912 to 1920, 91
were in the Eugenics Review, two were on
genetics related to eugenics, two were papers
published in The Messenger of Mathematics, and
the other two (in 1915 and 1920) were on
mathematical statistics. I’ll focus briefly on the
1915 and 1920 papers, as described by Stigler
(2005, 2006).
Mathematically, the 1915 derivation of
the distribution of the sample correlation
coefficient was the kind of work to which we all
strive. Fisher found the distribution, expressions
for moments, transformations (r-to-z) and
distributional relationships (including his earlier
work on the Student’s t-distribution),
expressions for the bias of r, and the maximum
likelihood estimator of ρ.
Right Nice Stuff
This type of work led Neyman (1951),
in his review of Fisher’s Contributions to
Mathematical Statistics (1950), to describe
Fisher as “a very able ‘manipulative’
mathematician” (p. 406). The Contributions
contain prefatory comments by Fisher on the
various papers. For the 1915 paper, Fisher wrote
“Here the method of defining a sample by the
coordinates of a point in Euclidean hyperspace
was introduced...” (p. 87). Unfortunately,
according to Neyman (1951), representing the
sample by a point in space was used for a similar
purpose by Karl Pearson in 1900 and - Neyman
suspected - had probably been used even before
that; thus, Fisher was wrong in this regard.
During the year following the
publication of Fisher’s article on the correlation
coefficient, Kirstine Smith (1916), working at
Karl Pearson’s laboratory, published an article
suggesting that when fitting a frequency curve
with grouped data, the constants should be
estimated using a minimum Chi-square criterion.
She illustrated the use of this criterion through a
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from the null hypothesis being true” (p. 17).
Thus, Fisher felt that one could not commit a
Type II error, because one never drew a
conclusion on the basis of a non-rejection of the
null hypothesis. As he wrote (Fisher, 1973), “To
a practical man, also, who rejects a hypothesis, it
is, of course, a matter of indifference with what
probability he might be led to accept the
hypothesis falsely, for in his case he is not
accepting it” (pp. 41-42). Some rightness to this
is evident.
Fisher always desired to establish a
correct theory of statistical inference. According
to Kempthorne (1976) “Fisher really did think
that one could develop by logical reasoning a
probability distribution for one’s knowledge of a
physical constant” (p. 496). Fisher, as Neyman
(1951) pointed out, seemed proud to have
formulated a measure of rational belief. Thus,
Fisher (1973) wrote that the level of significance
“in such cases fulfils the conditions of a measure
of the rational grounds for the disbelief it
engenders” (p. 43). Similarly, Fisher (1925a)
had observed that “if the value of P so calculated
turned out to be a small quantity such as 0.01,
we should conclude with some confidence that
the hypothesis was not in fact true of the
population actually sampled” (p. 90).
In similar vein, Fisher (1935c) stated
“more generally, however, a mathematical
quantity of a different kind, which I have termed
mathematical likelihood, appears to take its
place as a measure of rational belief…” (p. 40).
In addition, Fisher (1973) commented that “the
actual value of P obtainable from the table by
interpolation indicates the strength of the
evidence against the hypothesis” (p. 80). And
finally he also stated (1973) “What has now
appeared is that the mathematical concept of
probability is, in most cases, inadequate to
express our mental confidence or diffidence in
making such inferences, and that the
mathematical quantity which appears to be
appropriate…I have used the term ‘Likelihood’”
(pp. 9-10). There is a whole lot of wrong here, as
a measure of rational belief - even if obtainable provides a theory with no level of
epistemological virtue.
Note that even Neyman (1956) was not
immune to this inductive probability infection,
for he wrote in defense of control of the Type II

offered both by Edgeworth and by Fisher are
inaccurate, and the assertion, taken in its full
generality, is false” (Neyman, 1951, p. 407). So
Fisher was wrong in the assertion, the proof, and
in not giving Edgeworth some credit for priority.
Summarizing Fisher’s work, Neyman
(1951) wrote, “…three major concepts were
introduced by Fisher and consistently
propagandized by him in a number of
publications. These are mathematical likelihood
as a measure of the confidence in a hypothesis,
sufficient statistics, and fiducial probability,” (p.
407) all employed by Fisher in the service of
scientific induction.
Inference
Fisher (1947) felt that “the null
hypothesis is never proved or established, but is
possibly disproved, in the course of
experimentation. Every experiment may be said
to exist only in order to give the facts a chance
of disproving the null hypothesis” (p. 16).
Regarding the rate of error to assign to an
incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis, Fisher
wrote (1926) that “it is convenient to draw the
line at about the level at which we can say:
‘Either there is something in the treatment, or a
coincidence has occurred such as does not occur
more than once in twenty trials.’” “A scientific
fact,” he went on, “should be regarded as
experimentally established only if a properly
designed experiment rarely fails to give this
level of significance” (p. 504). Further, Fisher
(1973) wrote, “…in the vast majority of cases
the work is completed without any statement of
mathematical probability being made about the
hypothesis or hypotheses under consideration.
The simple rejection of a hypothesis, at an
assigned level of significance, is of this kind and
is often all that is needed, and all that is proper,
for the consideration of a hypothesis in relation
to the body of experimental data available” (p.
40). This all seems right.
Regarding Type II errors, Fisher (1947)
wrote that “the notion of an error of the so-called
‘second kind,’ due to accepting the null
hypothesis ‘when it is false’ may then be given a
meaning in reference to the quantity to be
estimated. It has no meaning with respect to
simple tests of significance, in which the only
available expectations are those which flow
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Personality
Fisher was not always charming and
gracious, and his running battles with Neyman
are well known. Regarding Karl Pearson, he
wrote, “Pearson’s energy was unbounded. In the
course of his long life he gained the devoted
service of a number of able assistants, some of
whom he did not treat particularly well. He was
prolific in magnificent, or grandiose, schemes
capable of realization perhaps by an army of
industrious robots responsive to a magic wand”
(1973, p. 2).
In similar vein, in a prefatory note on
Fisher’s
Contributions
to
Mathematical
Statistics is a personal attack on Sir Karl: “If
peevish intolerance of free opinion in others is a
sign of senility, it is one which he had developed
at an early age. Unscrupulous manipulation of
factual material is also a striking feature of the
whole corpus of Pearsonian writings, and in this
matter some blame does seem to attach to
Pearson’s contemporaries for not exposing his
arrogant pretensions” (p. 437). On multiple
occasions, Fisher (1958) criticized the ability of
mathematicians to do science; for example he
wrote “…with mathematical symbols, they are
of course experts. But it would be a mistake to
think that mathematicians as such are
particularly good at the inductive logical
processes which are needed in improving our
knowledge of the natural world, in reasoning
from observational facts to the inferences which
those facts warrant” (p. 261). Judging by most of
those in this audience, I believe that Fisher was
wrong in this.

error rate “…the numerical values of
probabilities of errors of the second kind are
most useful for deciding whether or not the
failure of a test to reject a given hypothesis
could be interpreted as any sort of
‘confirmation’ of this hypothesis” (p. 290).
Fiducial Probability and Fiducial Intervals
Fisher (1935b) wrote on fiducial
probability and fiducial intervals, about which
he stated, “This form of argument leads in
certain cases to rigorous probability statements
about the unknown parameters of the population
from which the observational data are a random
sample, without the assumption of any
knowledge
respecting
their
probability
distributions a priori.” His argument seems
basically the same as that which leads to
confidence intervals.
Defining t =

(x − μ)
, Fisher noted that
s/ n

the probability statement P(t > tα) = α can be
solved
in
terms
of
μ
to
yield

P ( μ < x − tα s / n ) = α . Fisher believed that
this probability statement holds even after the
sample values are substituted. Conversely,
Neyman and Pearson contended that at that
point, the probability is either zero or one.
Neyman (1956) offered a counter-argument in
terms of two flips of a fair coin, where the
variable Y is the number of heads appearing. So
it may be written that P(Y = 1) = 0.5 before the
experiment. If Y = 2 is observed, Fisher would
say the probability statement holds after
substituting, or that P(2 = 1) = 0.5. Fisher
appears to be wrong in this case.
To summarize, in Neyman’s (1951)
words,
“Unfortunately,
in
conceptual
mathematical statistics Fisher was much less
successful than in manipulatory, and of the three
above concepts only one, that of a sufficient
statistic, continues to be of substantial interest.
The other two proved to be either futile or selfcontradictory and have been more or less
generally abandoned” (p. 407). As may be
observed, it is fiducial probability that Neyman
considered self-contradictory, and I agree that a
search for a measure of rational belief is futile.
Thus, for Fisher, one out of three right will have
to do.

Analysis of Variance
It is not clear why Neyman did not
include analysis of variance among Fisher’s
major accomplishments. Perhaps, as seems
possible, it was due to personal enmity. Fisher’s
first paper on this subject, with W. A.
Mackenzie, was published in 1923. According to
Cochran (1980), “two aspects of this paper are
of historical interest. At that time, Fisher did not
fully understand the rules of analysis of
variance—his analysis is wrong—nor the role of
randomization” (p. 17), but by the time
Statistical Methods for Research Workers came
out in 1925, he was back on top of his game.
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I am grateful to Professor Fisher for a
sentence in the third part of his
contribution…: ‘I suggest that before
criticizing previous work it is always
wise to give enough study to the subject
to understand its purpose…’ The
sentence I have quoted applies to its
author, Professor Fisher, himself, who
not only criticized my paper, but blamed
me for a variety of sins of which I am
not guilty—all this before apparently
taking the trouble to discover what my
paper is about and what are the results.
According to him: I was unwise in the
choice of my topics, I have been
speaking of things with which I am not
fully acquainted, I deceived myself on
so simple a question, I forgot the
meaning of the facts, I confuse the
questions of estimation and the tests of
significance and I am apparently not
able to grasp the very simple argument!”
(p. 174)

Fisher was the first to discuss Neyman’s
1935 paper regarding analysis of variance in
randomized blocks and Latin Square designs,
Statistical
Problems
in
Agricultural
Experimentation, presented to the Royal
Statistical society. In this paper, Neyman
formulated a model that allowed each treatment
to respond differently in each plot, making no
assumption that treatment effects were fixed and
additive in the plots. As noted by Holschuh
(1980), “the null hypothesis he [Neyman]
considered was that the average treatment
response over the entire experimental area was
the same for all treatments. Under this null
hypothesis, he found that the z-test for the
randomized block design was unbiased” (p. 43)
but that the test for the Latin square design was,
in general, not unbiased (z is one-half the natural
log of the F-statistic). If it is assumed that the
correlation of plot errors is unity, the z-test is
unbiased.
Fisher (1935) began his comments by
writing, “…he [Fisher] had hoped that Dr.
Neyman’s paper would be on a subject with
which the author was fully acquainted, and on
which he could speak with authority…Since
seeing the paper, he had come to the conclusion
that Dr. Neyman had been somewhat unwise in
his choice of topics” (p. 154). Fisher focused
primarily on Neyman’s analysis of the z-test for
treatment effects. Fisher scolded Neyman for
obtaining the wrong result for the Latin square
design and said that he may have been “misled
by his excessive use of symbolism” (Holdschuh,
1980, p.43).
Fisher, however, had ignored Neyman’s
null hypothesis. The null hypothesis Fisher
entertained was that in any plot the treatments
have the same effect. In that case the correlation
of plot errors is unity and Neyman’s conclusion
is correct: the z-test is unbiased. In the course of
the discussion, Neyman (1935) exposed Fisher’s
error, but Fisher then claimed that the z-test was
only intended to test the null hypothesis of
identical treatment effects. Neyman replied that
he was “considering problems which are
important from the point of view of agriculture”
(p. 173).
Neyman (1935) began his written
response sarcastically, writing:

Here, again, Fisher seems to have been wrong.
It is in his book Design of Experiments
(1935a) that Fisher described a method that all
have come to know to be defective, except in
special cases, that being Fisher’s Least
Significant Difference (LSD) procedure. Fisher
wrote (1935a) that if the F test is not significant
in comparing yields of different varieties,
“…they will not often need to be considered
further,” whereas if the test was significant, he
continued,
…the null hypothesis has been falsified,
and may therefore be set aside. We shall
thereafter proceed to interpret the
differences between the varietal yields
as due at least in part to the inherent
qualities of the varieties, as manifested
on the conditions of the test, and shall be
concerned to know with what precision
these different yields have been
evaluated. …In either case the square
root of the variance gives the standard
deviation, and provides therefore a
means of judging which of the
differences among our varietal yield
values are sufficiently great to be
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higher conceptual level, and which one would
not like to do in error at a rate higher than the
adopted alpha. But the LSD method does just
that. If the F test is not significant, the
experiment is stopped. If it is significant in error,
it holds the error rate at the appropriate level in
falsifying the higher-level proposition, and any
contrasts examined afterward and found
significant erroneously do not contribute to the
overall error rate, because it is already wrong at
an acceptable rate. If the F is correctly
significant, one cannot make an error in
declaring the higher-level statement false, and
one is thus in fact-generating mode for the next
attempt at an improved explanation. So Fisher
was right after all.

regarded as well established, and which
are to be regarded as probably
fortuitous. If the experiment leaves any
grounds for practical doubt, values may
be compared by the t test… (pp. 64-65)
He implied that these t tests would each be
conducted with a Type I error rate of five
percent.
Fisher went on in the next paragraph to
describe a method introduced to the literature 26
years later by Dunn. He explained that when the
test is not significant, and yet the researcher goes
on to examine comparisons suggested by the
data, much caution should be used. He wrote
(1935a),
…for if the variants are numerous, a
comparison of the highest with the
lowest observed value, picked out from
the results, will often appear to be
significant, even from undifferentiated
material. Properly, such unforeseen
effects should be regarded only as
suggestions for future experimentation,
in which they can be deliberately
tested…Thus, in comparing the best
with the worst of ten tested varieties, we
have chosen the pair with the largest
apparent difference out of 45 pairs,
which might equally have been chosen.
We might, therefore, require the
probability of the observed difference to
be as small as 1 in 900, instead of 1 in
20,
before
attaching
statistical
significance to the contrast.” (p. 66)
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